I explore the efficiency properties of a decentralized labor market for scientists. I use a model where firms produce science by building labs and hiring researchers in a competitive market. Firms may invest in science to produce new scientific knowledge or to increase their absorptive capacity: the ability to use scientific knowledge produced outside of the firm. In both cases firms underinvest in labs. More interestingly, when firms' investment in science is motivated by absorptive capacity, researchers and labs may be substitutes in the revenue function, even though they are complements in the research production function. This generates a novel form of inefficiency: for any given distribution of labs, the allocation of researchers to firms is non optimal. Subsidies to the investment in labs cannot restore the first best. I show that the existence of scientists' reputation concerns, by preventing the free transfer of surplus between firms and researchers, may affect the allocation of scientists to labs and increase total welfare.
Introduction
How is the allocation of scientic talent determined in a competitive market? Do the best scientists work in the biggest labs, on the most promising research projects, in the location that maximizes their research output? I explore these questions using a model of science production where heterogeneous researchers are hired by heterogeneous rms in order to work in their labs. The ability of each researcher determines the productivity of each lab. The goal of this paper is to describe conditions under which a frictionless job market for scientists generates an inecient allocation of scientists to labs. Scientic research carried out by rms produces two distinct outputs, called byCohen and Levinthal (1989) the two faces of R&D:
• new science to be used, for example, in the production of new patents.
• absorptive capacity allowing rms to be always up to date with the science produced by other rms and universities. Scientic research provides a ticket of admission to an information network (Rosenberg, 1990, p.170) . Also, science is dicult: only scientists that are actively engaged in research can read and understand several papers in a timely fashion. In other words, using publicly available science can be costly to rms; in order to lower this cost rms build absorptive capacity by investing in scientic research.
When rms invest in science mainly to produce new science, the allocation of researchers to labs is ecient.
In this case, assuming that researchers and labs are complement in the production of science, a rm that invested in a large lab will benet from a productive researcher more than a rm that invested in a small lab.
Hence, the private sector allocation of researcher to labs is Positive Assortative Matching (PAM) assigning productive researchers to large labs. This is also the allocation that maximizes the total amount of science produced for given investment in labs, hence it is the ecient allocation.
On the other hand, when rms invest in science mainly to increase their absorptive capacity, the two inputs in the production of science -labs and scientists -may be substitutes in the rms' revenue function.
To understand the intuition, let's consider a simple example: a rm can use science produced by universities and other rms at no cost if and only if this rm achieves a given level of scientic output. To reach this goal, this rm will either invest in a very advanced lab or hire a very productive researcher: it will never invest in a large lab and hire a very smart researcher since there is no benet from producing path-breaking science as opposed to producing just enough science to meet the required threshold. The competitive market allocation of researchers to labs takes the form of a Negative Assortative Matching (NAM) rule: the least productive researcher among the ones that are hired is assigned to the biggest lab in the economy. More in general, the allocation of researchers to labs is NAM whenever rms' marginal benet from producing science decreases rapidly.
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1 The fact that the marginal benet from producing science may decrease very rapidly is empirically supported by Gittelman and Kogut (2003) , who nd that scientic knowledge and patents are related, but good publications and good patents are not (ibid, p. 380). This prediction nds empirical support in the literature on rms size and R&D productivity, showing that small rms are often more productive than large rms in their R&D eort. Assuming that large rms have lower cost of investing in labs, 2 the model predicts that, because of absorptive capacity, there should be a negative relationship between scientists productivity and rm's size. By looking at number of patents produced in rms of dierent size, several authors document that larger rms are indeed less productive than small rms in their R&D eort.
3 The same type of evidence has been found looking exclusively at scientic research. By collecting data on publicly traded rms, Halperin and Chakrabarti (1987) nd that the number of papers produced per dollar of R&D spending is negatively correlated with rms size and with total R&D spending. More directly, Elfenbein, Hamilton, and Zenger (2010) look at the allocation of scientists to rms, and show that productive R&D workers are more likely to work for small rms than for big rms.
When researcher and labs are complements in the science production function, total science produced is maximized under a PAM rule assigning the best researchers to the biggest labs. Therefore, in the allocation of researchers to labs, there is a trade-o between producing science and building absorptive capacity. When rms aim at building absorptive capacity, for any given distribution of labs the private sector minimizes the amount of science produced. Because of the externality in the production of science, the decentralized allocation of researchers to labs is inecient. This ineciency is novel and arises in addition to the usual underinvestment in public goods. I show that an appropriate set of taxes/subsidies to the amount of science produced by each rm can solve the ineciency by inducing the rst-best investment and the rst-best allocation of researchers to rms. I also show that subsidies to rms' investment alone cannot restore eciency since they do not aect the job market for researchers.
In the nal part of the paper I develop a version of the model where researchers care about reputation, which is built by producing science, and that is not transferable to rms. I show that, if reputation concerns are strong enough, the equilibrium in the private sector may switch from NAM to PAM. Intuitively, researchers may receive most of their compensation in form of reputation rather than as a monetary payment.
I also show that the existence reputation concerns may increase total welfare because of its eect on the equilibrium matching pattern. The more general point is that, when there are externalities, welfare may increase by limiting the agents' freedom to bargain over the surplus generated within the match.
Literature
Given the importance of scientic research as an engine of growth in modern economies, a large body of literature has explored the possible ineciencies arising in the production of science. Most of these works focused on the public good nature of science and the underinvestment in research (see Arrow, 1962) , the tension between basic and applied research (see recently Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein, 2008) , the diculty in providing incentives in R&D (see, for example, Aghion and Tirole, 1994) . To the best of my knowledge, mine is the rst paper looking at the ineciencies arising in the allocation of scientic talent to dierent labs.
A closely related literature looked at the allocation of scientic talent to dierent tasks. In particular, Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) develop a growth model where managerial talent can be employed either in innovative activities, or in the adoption of new technology. The main assumption is that talent matters more for innovation than for adoption. Depending on the distance to the scientic frontier, dierent rms will choose a dierent strategy and therefore hire a dierent type of manager. My framework is related, since absorptive capacity and adoption achieve the same goal. However, in my model there is only one task -producing science -that can be performed for dierent reasons. In addition, I look at the allocation of scientists assuming that all rms share the same motive for science production, and not at the allocation of talent across rms doing research for dierent reasons.
It has long been observed that, sometimes, rms perform research to improve their ability to use outside knowledge. This idea was rst brought forward by Tilton (1971) , who analyzes the evolution of the semiconductor industry during the '50s and '60s. Tilton observes that, for rms in this industry, investing in R&D was a form of insurance: it guaranteed to be up to date with the latest scientic breakthrough.
The term absorptive capacity was introduced by Cohen and Levinthal (1989) , who provide both the rst theoretical model of this concept and its rst empirical test. Other important empirical works are Cockburn and Henderson (1998) , Gambardella (1992) and Grith, Redding, and Reenen (2004) . On the theory side, several researchers explored the strategic implications of absorptive capacity (see, for example, Hammerschmidt, 2006 , Kamien and Zang, 2000 and Leahy and Neary, 2007 , and its implications for economic growth (see Grith, Redding, and Van Reenen, 2003) . My paper contributes to this literature by showing that absorptive capacity has also implications for the allocation of scientists to rms and labs.
The literature on knowledge spillover and geography of innovation (reviewed in Audretsch and Feldman, 2004) shows that, because of local spillovers, the presence of very productive scientists has a positive impact on the productivity of other scientists within the same rm. However, the eciency properties of the the job market for researchers have not been discussed before, despite headline-grabbing stories about elite scientists leaving one country for another country, or leaving one rm for another rm.
4 With this respect, I show that the allocation of scientists across rms can be inecient. In some circumstances, there may be an aggregate welfare gain (in addition to a local gain and a local loss) from reallocating scientists from lab to another lab.
Finally, the existing empirical investigations on the allocation of resources to researchers deal exclusively with specic public institutions. For example, Arora, David, and Gambardella (1998) analyze the funding allocation decisions of the Italian CNR (equivalent to the NSF) and show that the reputation (past publication record) is the main explanatory variable. I am not aware of any study looking at the determinants of the allocation of resources to researchers working in the private sector.
Invest in labs
Split surplus Match and produce science Generate surplus In the next section, I describe the model. In the second section, I characterize the equilibrium for a given distribution of labs. In the third section, I derive the distribution of labs, formally dene the equilibrium, and prove its existence. In the fourth section I discuss the normative aspects of the model. I introduce reputation concerns in the fth section. In the last section I conclude by discussing possible empirical tests, policy implications, and extensions.
The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of rms and a continuum of scientists. Firms dier in their productivity p, continuously distributed over P = [0,p] , and researchers dier in their ability a, continuously distributed over A = [0,ā]. All agents have the same outside option assumed to be zero. The economy runs for three periods.
Investing in Labs.
In 
Producing Science.
In period t = 1, each researcher is hired by one rm and works in the rm's lab. The amount of research produced within each match is:
Note that the two inputs are complements in the research production function. This implies that, for given distribution of labs, the allocation of researchers to labs that maximizes the production of science is Positive Assortative Matching (PAM): the most productive researcher should work in the biggest lab.
The reader should interpret the lab size L as everything that can increase the chance of a scientic discovery for given researcher's ability. This include physical machines (a bigger telescope, a more powerful microscope, a state of the art DNA sequencing machine), as well as the number of technicians and post-docs.
The fact that some of these inputs do not require an investment ex-ante but can be purchased after hiring 6 the researcher will turn out to be irrelevant. In the next section I will show that, in equilibrium, rms invest taken as given the researcher allocated to them. This implies that the timing could be reversed with no eect on the equilibrium investment.
Finally, in reality, researchers work in team. This can be incorporated into the model by dening a as the research team's average quality. A previous matching stage determines how researchers form research teams, and how from a distribution of individual ability we can derive the distribution of a. In order to keep the model as simple as possible, I will not pursue this interpretation further.
The Private Benet of Research.
At the beginning of the last period (t = 2) there is a stock of new science available in the economy. Call its expected commercial value V , and interpret it as the value of all the patents that can be produced out of the available science. The private surplus generated by a match between a researcher and a rm during period t = 1 depends on the amount of research carried out in house and the aggregate science V . I assume that the private surplus has an additive form:
where g() is continuous and dierentiable, g () > 0 and g () ≤ 0. The surplus produced is then split between researcher and rm. Finally, V is taken as given by rms and researchers but will be determined endogenously.
Note how rms do not compete with each other on the product market. The reader should imagine a scientic eld where many small rms produce patents out of the same scientic base. For example, all rms may belong to the bio-tech sector, some of them developing DNA sequencing machines, some developing drugs, others developing bacteria that can produce bio-fuel out of garbage. Some rms will compete with each other, some will not compete, some other will complement each others. For this reason I abstract from competition issues.
The following two assumptions formally introduce absorptive capacity into the model: Assumption 1. It is impossible to understand a new piece of science if no research is carried out in house:
Remember that V represents the new science that will be introduced tomorrow. Under the above assumption, rms need to produce some in-house science today if they want to be active in the market and exploit the new aggregate science V . Note that this does not imply that the science produced in-house 5 The fact that science enters additively in the private-surplus function will be relevant only when discussing the existence of the general equilibrium. The partial equilibrium analysis will take V as given, and will not be aected by the particular functional form. Furthermore, despite the additive form, in the aggregate there will be a form of complementarity between the stock of science and the return on scientic research. Although each rm's marginal benet from investing in science does not depend on the stock of science, the number of rms investing will change with V . In particular the higher V , the higher the number of rms producing science, and the higher the total investment in scientic research within a sector.
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should be enough to lead to any publication or scientic discovery, neither it implies that all the rms active in the market invest in labs, but it does mean that all the rms active in the market hire a researcher.
Assumption 2. The marginal benet of producing science is decreasing rapidly: g (x) < 0.
Assumption 2 captures the following consideration. Absorptive capacity implies that rms produce science so that their in-house researchers can be part of the scientic community. Let's say that this is achieved by attending conferences. It follows that a rm will want to produce enough science so that its researcher can attend conferences, but producing even more science provides little extra value. Therefore, the marginal benet a rm's enjoy from doing research is decreasing rapidly.
Lemma 3. Under assumptions 1 and 2, from the private sector's point of view the two inputs are always substitutes:
The proof of proposition 3 is based on the fact that, when both assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the curvature of the cost function g() is given by:
This curvature implies substitutability.
To have an intuitive grasp about the role played by assumptions 1 and 2, assume for a moment that g() is an isoelastic function. Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that g() is bounded above. This is quite natural whenever rms invest in labs to reduce their cost of using outside science, so that the benet a rm receives from carrying out research is never above V . This assumptions can also accommodate the case when investing in science has a direct benet, in the sense that g() can be positive, as long as this benet has an upper bound.
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In what follows, I will assume that absorptive capacity is the main reason why rms perform research in the sense that assumptions 1 and 2 are satised. In subsection 3.1 I will address the case where rms invest in scientic research not to increase their absorptive capacity but to produce new science.
Endogenous Science.
The value of science is taken as given by rms but it is determined endogenously by aggregating all the research carried out in the economy. Call ν the expected commercial value of a unit of research and h(L)
The expected value of the stock of science is given by: 3 The Equilibrium for Given Investment in Labs and for Given Aggregate Science.
In this section, I derive the equilibrium arising in period t = 1, when rms have already invested in labs.
I analyze the problem taking as given the total amount of science produced in the economy V , and the investment made by each rm.
At this stage, rms dier only in the size of the lab they own. Once the distribution of labs is determined the productivity parameter p does not aect the equilibrium anymore. Let's introduce the following notation:
• x(L) : R + → R + , the payo of a rm with lab L.
• w(a) : A → R + , the payo of a researcher with ability a.
Denition 4. For given V , the job market for researchers is in equilibrium if:
• Stability:
The existence of a unique equilibrium for given V is a standard result in matching theory (see, for example, Kamecke (1992) ).
Lemma 5. Negative assortative matching (NAM) in the job market for researchers: the most productive researchers work in the smallest labs and the least productive researchers work in the biggest labs. Similarly, the most productive researchers work in the smallest rms and the least productive researchers work in the biggest rm.
Proof. It follows immediately from lemma 3.
From the rms' point of view, researchers and labs are substitutes. Since the private sector allocates researchers to labs so to maximize their marginal product, it follows that, in equilibrium, the most productive researchers will work in the smallest labs. However, labs and researchers' ability are complements in the research production function. The matching rule maximizing the total stock of science is PAM: the best researcher should work in the biggest lab. Therefore, the private sector, for a given distribution of labs, is minimizing the value of science V . There is a trade-o between maximizing science and maximizing the use of science. Since the private sector only considers the latter, the decentralized equilibrium is inecient.
Proposition 6. For given distribution of labs, if ν is high enough, the matching pattern emerging in the private sector is inecient. 7 9
Proof. See appendix.
3.1 Discussion: Beyond Absorptive Capacity.
Suppose now that assumptions 1 and 2 do not hold. The proof of proposition 6 it is based on the fact that, over some range with positive mass of researchers and labs, the social-welfare function is supermodular while the private-surplus function is submodular. This implies that the private sector allocation is inecient. The reason is that, over that specic range, the equilibrium matching will be NAM, but welfare can be improved by implementing PAM. Therefore, even in situations where assumptions 1 and 2 do not hold, it is possible for the private sector matching pattern to be inecient, as long as the social welfare function is locally supermodular while the revenue function is locally submodular for some {a, L}. However, if the function Φ(a, L) is not globally submodular in a and L, the exact allocation of labs to researchers arising in the market can only be determined numerically.
Suppose now that rms invest in research because they seek to benet from the knowledge they produce, as opposed to only increasing their absorptive capacity. In this case, the two inputs in the production of science are complements also in the revenue function. Hence the decentralised allocation of scientists to lab is Positive Assortative Matching, assigning the most productive researcher to the biggest lab. This allocation is ecient, since there is no contrast between rms' objective and the production of science. However, Lemma 8 in the next section will show that rms underinvest in labs because they do not fully appropriate the benet of new science. Therefore, if labs and researchers are global complements, the model collapses back to a standard model of knowledge production where the only source of ineciency is the rms' underinvesment.
The Ex-Ante Equilibrium
Let's introduce some notation:
• i(p) : P ⇒ R + , the equilibrium investment in labs made by a rm p.
•m(p) ≡ m(i(p)) : P ⇒ A, the matching rule on the equilibrium path (for investment performed by some rms) mapping rms to researchers.
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•x(p) ≡ x(i(p)) : P → R + , the payo of rms on the equilibrium path.
• l(a) ≡ i(m −1 (a)) the lab a researcher of ability a receives in equilibrium.
The denition of equilibrium I use is similar to the one in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001) . The dierences are that, here, only one of the two sides invests.
Denition 7. The quadruple {i(.), m(.), x(.), w(.)} constitutes an equilibrium if:
1. The investment is optimal:
Ex post, the matching {i(.),m(.),x(.), w(.)} is feasible and stable:
• Feasibility:
3. For L / ∈ {L : L = i(p) for some p ∈ P } (investments o the equilibrium path):
To understand the denition, assume that there is an equilibrium, and consider deviations made by a single rm. Since we are in a large economy, any action this rm may take has no impact on the equilibrium w(a). Therefore, whatever the investment, this rm can match with any researcher a provided that it pays w(a).
Lemma 8. In equilibrium, for L ≥ 0:
Proof. From point 3 of the denition of equilibrium.
Lemma 8 implies that rms' investment solves:
In other words, rms maximize surplus taking V and the researchers they will be matched with as given.
Since the social planner would take into account the impact of the individual investment on the total stock of science, lemma 8 implies that the investment is inecient. Finally, note that the matching pattern expected to emerge in the following period aects the investment decisions. It follows, for example, that any policy attempting to change the allocation of researchers to labs will aect the investment. This will turn out to be relevant in section 6.
10 Also, any subsidy to the investment in labs may reduce the underinvestment, but it is unable to aect the ineciency in the matching between labs and researchers. In the next section I will show that the only way to reach the rst best in this economy is using a set of taxes and subsidies to the amount of science produced by each rm.
9 The general denition of feasibility is more complicated (see Cole et al. (2001) ). However, in the cases I consider here it is possible to use this simpler version.
10 See Gall, Legros, and Newman (2009) for an analysis of this problem in an educational context. Proposition 9. An equilibrium with zero research always exists. If the commercial value of research ν is high enough, there are also equilibria where a positive amount of science is produced. In these equilibria, researchers belonging to the set [a, a] match with rms investing l(a), where:
∂c(s, i(p)) ∂L γ(p)dp Proof. See appendix. Figure 2 illustrates the case of two positive investment equilibria, given by the intersection of V (a) and a(V ), where V (a) represents the aggregate science produced as a function of the measure of researchers employed, and a(V ) represents the worst researcher employed in the economy for given aggregate science V .
Of the two equilibria represented in gure 2, one can be considered stable (the high V , low a one) and the other unstable.
By focusing on the stable equilibrium, it is possible to make a few comparative static exercises. If the value of a discovery ν increases, V (a) moves upward: more researchers are matched and more research is 12 produced. It is also possible to introduce an exogenous stock of science V f , science produced, for example, by a foreign country. The graph should be modied by writing on the vertical axes V h instead of V , and by shifting a(V h ) downward: home country is producing more research as well. Obviously, all the comparative statics are reversed if we consider the unstable equilibrium.
The First Best
The social welfare generated within each match is:
This function is neither globally supermodular nor globally submodular. It follows that the optimal allocation of researchers to labs can only be derived numerically, and it may involve implementing PAM over some range, and NAM over some other range. Intuitively, the social planner may, over some range, give priority to the production of science, and over some other to the use of science.
However, we know that the social planner problem has a unique solution. This implies that rst-best investment in labs and rst-best allocation of researchers can be easily implemented if transfers based on the amount of science produced by each rm are feasible.
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Proposition 10. The rst best is implementable announcing the following rule: every rm producing some science receives a transfer equal to the value of the science produced by that rm minus V .
Since there is a mass 1 of rms, V is the value of the average amount of science produced. Therefore, rms producing more than the average receive a subsidy, while the others are taxed. However, even if scientic output is observable, it is usually non contractible and, therefore, non taxable. For this reason, the rst-best implementation may be impossible to implement.
6 Non-Transferable Utility in The Production of Science: Reputation Concerns.
So far I assumed that the surplus generated within a match can be freely split between scientists and rm.
However, the production of science is rid with restrictions to agents' ability to transfer utility, and this may impact the equilibrium allocation arising in the competitive market (see Legros and Newman (2007) ). In this section I move to a Non Transferrable Utility (NTU) environment by assuming that part of the surplus generated within a match is in the form of scientists' reputation, and that reputation cannot be transferred back to the rm because of liquidity constraints.
12 I show that NTU has indeed the usual eect on the 11 See Hammond (1995) . 12 NTU can arise in many other cases. For example, when scientists' eort impact the value of science produced and rms cannot implement incentive schemes depending on the value of output, the particular surplus split agreed ex ante determines total surplus, giving rise to a NTU model. equilibrium matching: if it is strong enough it will generate a PAM allocation. More interestingly, in this case NTU may be welfare improving since PAM is the the science-maximizing allocation of scientists to labs.
Since the work of Merton (1957) , it is well known that researchers care about reputation. Merton calls it the race for priority: scientists want to be recognized as the rst to discover something. The role of reputation in science has already been explored in the economic literature by Dasgupta and David (1985) .
Their argument is that, on the one hand, reputation motivates researchers. This is very important because an incentive scheme based exclusively on the quality of scientic output would be very hard to implement.
On the other hand, reputation fosters openness. This guarantees the circulation of ideas and generates a faster pace of scientic progress. Here I will show that reputation may aect the production of science in an additional way: by changing the way rms and scientists are matched in equilibrium.
Let's assume that the researchers' utility is:
where w(a) ≥ 0 is the monetary payment received working for the rm, and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of surplus that accrue to the agent as reputation: the utility derived from doing science. Researchers may care about science because their future earning depend on it (through the reputation they build today), or simply because they like science. I assume that the fraction (1 − ρ)Φ(a, L) of surplus can be split among researchers and rms.
Lemma 11. For given distribution of labs, if reputation concerns are strong enough
the equilibrium matching is PAM. If the value of science ν is large enough, by moving from ρ = 0 to some
social welfare increases.
Proof. In appendix.
Intuitively, researchers are willing to give up their cash payment in order to produce science.
13 Because of the complementarity between labs and researchers, a productive researcher is always willing to give up more than an unproductive researcher for the right to work in a rm with a given lab. Hence the payo of both sides (rms and scientists) is increasing in the other side's type. It follows that the equilibrium matching is PAM.
Remember that the social welfare generated within each match is equal to
When reputation concerns change the equilibrium matching from NAM to PAM, for given distribution of labs the eect on the social welfare is twofold. On the one hand, if rms are driven by absorptive capacity, the aggregate cost of using outside science will be higher (i.e. low aggregate g(af (L))). On the other hand, the aggregate production of science will increase. This will lead to a welfare improvement as long as the parameter ν (measuring the value of a unit of science) is high enough.
Let's now consider the investment stage. When ρ is large, both benet and marginal benet from investing in labs will be low. Hence NTU will depress investment. It is however easy to build cases where the elasticity of the rms investment is low enough so that the overall welfare eect of reputation concerns is positive. For example, setting c(s, L) = max{s, L} n for n large enough, guarantees that rms will simply set L = s no matter ρ, and the argument made for the case of xed labs distribution continues to hold.
Conclusions
Firms invest in scientic research for several reasons. The one proposed most often in the economic literature is production: rms invest in research to increase the stock of scientic knowledge. A second recentlyproposed explanation is absorptive capacity: using outside science is costly to rms, and this cost is lower if rms produce science in house.
In this paper I build a model where rms invest in labs and hire researchers in order to produce science, and I analyze the competitive allocation of researchers under dierent motives for science production. I argue that absorptive capacity may lead to an inecient allocation of researchers to labs. I also show that the presence of non transferability such as reputation may aect this allocation. If the reputation concerns are strong enough, the matching pattern emerging in the private sector is PAM: good researchers work in big labs. It follows that the presence of reputation concerns may increase total welfare.
The model can be tested empirically in several ways. For example, it should be possible to check whether labs and researchers are substitutes in the private sector. Substitutability implies that the increase in revenues following an increase in expenditure in research facilities should be greater in rms with unproductive researchers than in rms with productive researchers. Alternatively, one could check the market allocation of researchers to rms. In this case, however, the test should take into consideration the strength of the reputation concerns. Without reputation, the model predicts NAM. If reputation concerns exist and have the features I derived, we should observe PAM. For example, assuming that old researchers are less sensitive to reputation than young ones, the model predicts that productive young researchers should work in big labs and unproductive young researcher should work in small labs, while productive old researchers should work in small labs and unproductive old researchers should work in big labs.
dene:
where a ,σ and b ,σ are such that:
because of the strict inequality, it is always possible to take a σ < 1, arbitrarily close to one, such that:
this implies that, in a neighborhood of , g(x) < K ,σ (x). Finally, note that x = 0 is in a neighborhood of and at the same time K ,σ (0) is well dened for σ < 1. Therefore g (0) is well dened and nite. This is a contradiction.
Point 2 alone implies that the inputs are substitutes for small enough af (L). Point 1 and point 2 imply that the two inputs are always substitutes.
Proof of Proposition 6.
The social welfare generated within each match is equal to:
one obvious dierence between the rst best allocation and the private sector allocation is in who is matched.
In the private sector, researchers and labs are matched if V ≥ −g(af (L)). Note that V is determined endogenously, and that there are multiple equilibria. However, the private sector condition for being matched is, in general, dierent than the social optimal one.
Going back to the matching pattern, note that NAM is inecient only under some conditions on ν. To see this, imagine that the economy is so unproductive (low ν) that both from the social point of view and from the private point of view, nobody should be matched. In this case any matching pattern will lead to the same welfare (zero) so that NAM is trivially ecient.
It is easy to show that SW 12 > 0 if:
Given this, we can be in one out of three possible situations. The rst one is illustrated in gure 3a. In this case there is no complementarity in the relevant range of the social welfare function and NAM is ecient.
Imagine now to increase ν. The area of complementarity expands, and eventually we reach the situation illustrated in gure 3b. In this case, it is possible for the social planner to reallocate some researchers and some labs in order to have an area of PAM. However, this leaves some unmatched agents, that should be re-matched somehow. Whether this deviation increases social welfare or not is left to be determined in future works. If ν is even higher, eventually the economy will reach the situation depicted in gure 3c. In this case it is possible to rematch researchers between a 1 and a 2 with labs from L 1 and L 2 according to PAM and increase the social welfare.
Proof of Proposition 9.
For the rst part, note that if rms expect V = 0, they have no reason to invest in research. Therefore, the total science produced will be zero.
Consider an equilibrium with positive investment. In general, if all the researchers and all the entrepreneurs in the economy were matched, the worst member of each group could enjoy a strictly positive payo. In our case, since the worst researcher in the economy is a = 0 and lim ∂c(p, i(p)) ∂L γ(p)dp ≡ P (a)
where γ(p) is the p.d.f. of p, and the second equality follows from lemma 8 and equation 2. In other words, the payo received by the most productive rm depends on the productivity of the worst researcher matched.
The equilibrium a and V are the solutions to: a = {a : Φ(a, l(a)) = P (a)}
and:
af (L(a))z(a)da
The equilibrium with positive investment exists if there is a {a, V } solution to equations 6 and 7.
Note that equation 7 has a nite value at a = 0, is equal to zero at a = a, and is strictly decreasing. Proof of Proposition 10.
The social welfare generated in each match is equal to:
the private surplus is:
clearly, a transfer like the one described transforms the private surplus into the social welfare function.
Finally, because of lemma 8, when rms invest they equate marginal cost to marginal benet. In this case, it implies that rms' investment is ecient.
Proof of Lemma 11.
I will say that NTU is binding whenever a scientist receives no cash payments and is rewarded exclusively in reputation. It is easy to see that, when NTU is binding, the equilibrium must be (local) PAM, since both sides' payos are (locally) increasing in the other side's type. Also, if NTU is not binding, the equilibrium cannot be local PAM.
Assume that NTU is binding all the way. The best researcher could match with the smallest lab, since the rm with the smallest lab is the one that can oer the largest cash payment. This is not a protable deviation as long as:
ρΦ(a, L)) > Φ(a, L)
